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The right of everyone to his or her own likeness is today well recog-
nized in the overwhelming majority of American jurisdictions and in
other countries. This right may be based on property or quasi-property
rights, extended to such an intangible as someone's physiognomy, on the
idea of privacy, or on special legislative enactments, providing protection
to an interest which the common-law courts had difficulty in proclaiming.
In France-a codified legal system-the courts have had little trouble in
asserting that the right to likeness exists, even in the absence of statutory
provisions regulating the problem. The right to likeness derived from the
vague concept of the right to personality, a concept which once stood as a
separate legal institution in French law. Only as late as 1970 did the
French enact a statute protecting privacy."
The extent and application of every right has to be delineated. Even
so, there will always be situations in which a right of one individual will
overlap or conflict with that of another. In the case of likeness, rarely
does someone endeavor not even to show his face to others, although
there may be the case of a hermit hiding from the commotion of life
somewhere on a desert or that of a nun whose religious order prohibits
the exhibition of her physiognomy to outsiders. In general, to repeat the
* Visiting Distinguished Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law; LL.M.
1939, University of Warsaw; Dr. en Droit 1947, University of Paris; J.D. 1950; LL.M. 1957,
S.J.D. 1957, Northwestern University School of Law. The author extends thanks to his as-
sistant Ann Victoria Hopcroft for her help in the preparation of the final text of the article.
I C. civ. art. 9, No. 70-643 (1970).
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statement by Aristotle, "man is a 'zoion politicon' "-a social or political
creature.' He lives surrounded by other people, communicates with them,
and depends on contacts with them for his physical and mental well-be-
ing. At all times, he exposes his face to the sight of his fellow man. He
cannot, and does not generally desire to, hide his physiognomy along with
his secret memoirs or correspondence.
Among the problems of how to implement the right to likeness, there
is one of a basic nature: do we have the right to prevent others even from
the taking of our likeness by photograph, or just from using the photo-
graph? Shooting pictures without previous consent, express or implied,
occurs usually in public places.' Once we place ourselves in the sight of all
who may happen to be at the same spot, we become a part of the general
scenery. May we still protest to our picture being taken and used?
It would seem that the first of the above questions is academic since
not many persons are interested in taking photographs just for the fun of
it, without making use of them. Indeed, litigation on this point is scarce.
The problem is interesting, however, from the theoretical viewpoint. The
second question, regarding the use of photographs taken in public places,
in which some persons appear, raises practical problems.
In France, solid foundations for the right of privacy were laid by a
series of decisions beginning in the middle of the nineteenth century.3
They emphasized the right of everyone to his own likeness."
In more modern literature, conflicting views have been expressed on
the question of how extensive the protection should be. While recognizing
the right of citizens to object to the publication of their photographs,
Nerson asserted that the possibility of prohibiting the very taking of the
pictures would be "a too fargoing prerogative,"' and continued:
An absolute prohibition of any representation of a picture would be conceiv-
able if the subject should want and could live in a state of absolute solitude;
to the contrary, his real participation in numerous concrete relations to the
social life implies a consent to these objective contracts of his person.
Therefore, the right to his own likeness does not include the right to object
to any reproduction of his own person; but it involves the power to prohibit
' "Man is by nature an animal intended to live in society." ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 1253a.
3 Wagner, The Development of the Theory of the Right to Privacy in France, 1971 WASH.
U. L.Q. 45.
4 Wagner, The Right to One's Own Likeness in French Law, 46 IND. L.J. 1, 1 (1970). For a
comparison of the early cases on likeness in France, England, and the United States, see
Wagner, The Dispute on the Right to Reproduce the Likeness of Mickiewicz after the
Death of the Poet and Contemporary Legal Developments, in COLLECTION OF PAPERS SUB-
MITTED TO THE POLISH CONGRESS OF CONTEMPORARY SCIENCE AND CULTURE IN EXILE IN
LONDON 447 (1970).
1 NERSON, LES DROITS EXTRAPATRIMONIAUX (Extra-Financial Rights) (1939).
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any publication.6
A contrary view has been taken by Kayser, who could not disassoci-
ate the right to take photographs from that of publishing them, and
stated:
It does not seem possible to admit that a person should have the liberty of
taking a picture which he would have no liberty to publish. On the other
hand, the power to object to the publication of a picture has as a natural
complement the right to object to its creation.7
Desbois saw some merit in both approaches. On the one hand, he
made an analogy between taking a photograph and making a copy of a
literary piece of work for private use, to which no consent of the author
would be necessary, as contrasted with circulating copies of the same lit-
erary production which would be unlawful. On the other hand, more
persuasive arguments seemed to him to outweigh the previous
considerations:
[T]he extension of the prohibition seems justified. Indeed, by the very defi-
nition, private life is closed to indiscreet glances; only those persons who are
invited or admitted to penetrate there may see what is going on. But this
authorization does not include, ipso facto, permission to procure a souvenir
by taking a negative .... Thus, it is not only the divulgence of matters
taken from private life which depends on the discretionary power of the
persons interested, but also, at the very outset, the taking of the view.6
Again, Stoufflet recognized the possibility of inflicting damages not
only because of circumstances in which the likeness was circulated, but
also by the very fact of taking the picture. However, he took a lenient
view on shooting street pictures in normal situations. He rejected the dis-
tinction between street scenes in which a person is incidentally repre-
sented and photographs of individuals as main subjects in a public place,
arguing that the distinction would be difficult to apply. To Stoufflet, a
person circulating on a public way places himself outside of his sphere of
6 Id. For Nerson's observations, along the same lines, on cases involving persons and family
rights, see 1966 REV. TRIM. DR. Civ. 65, 67. A recent treatise on civil law emphasized that
coupled with the right to prohibit the reproduction of someone's likeness is the right to
prohibit the taking of a photograph without consent. CARBONNIER, DROIT CIvL (Civil Law)
t.1, No. 70 (8th ed. 1969).
7 Kayser, Le droit 6 l'image (The Right to Likeness) in 2 MELANGES PAuL RoutmR 73, 79
(1961). One recent study suggested that a separate consent should be required for the taking
and for the use of a photograph. Le droit au respect de la vie privee (The Right to the
Respect of Private Life) [1968] Juris-classeur p6riodique, la semaine juridique I [J.C.P.] No.
25, 2136.
1 Desbois, Analysis of Cases in the Field of Literary and Artistic Property, 1963 REv.
TRIM. DR. COM. 827, 830.
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privacy.'
The first effort to pinpoint applicable rules by a legislative text in
France occurred during the work of the Commission of the Reform of the
Civil Code in 1951. The text submitted to this body by its secretary,
Houin, provided for the possibility of recovery in the case of an uncon-
sented "publication, exhibition or use" 10 of another's likeness. Comment-
ing upon the suggested provision, the president of the Commission, Jul-
liot de la Morandifre, pointed out that the taking of the likeness would
not, by itself, be proscribed. Agreeing with the approach, he continued:
A tourist who makes a photograph of a passer-by, at the same time as of a
historical monument, cannot be prohibited from taking this view; but, on
the contrary, it is forbidden to him to publish and e.g., to exhibit this pho-
tograph in a display window. In case of need, it is up to the police power to
be more severe, e.g., by prohibiting photographing others by itinerant pro-
fessionals. Likewise, it is up to criminal judges to forbid scandalous prac-
tices of certain reporters."
The Commission went along with the proposal, and the text it
adopted repeated the phraseology which had been submitted to it, with a
minor stylistic change. 2
In a 1966 French case,18 the tribunal for important cases of the Seine
stated that everyone has the right to object to his likeness being either
photographically "arrested" or exhibited or published. The broad view
taken by the Tribunal, however, was only by way of dictum (if such a
term may be applied to French opinions), since the plaintiff's picture in
the case was published by four defendants in their magazines, some with
damaging comments.
In the United States, in the famous article by Warren and Bran-
deis,"' which laid the foundation for the legal protection of privacy, the
authors did not examine the question whether taking photographs should
be treated differently than using them. The classic dissent of Judge Gray
in Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co.,15 which inspired many future
Stouffliet, Le droit de la personne sur son image, [1957] J.C.P. I 1374. This, however, does
not seem to be convincing. Indeed, unless one is a Howard Hughes, how can one become a
recluse and avoid being seen by others? We have no choice but to appear in some public
places, even if we would prefer to live the life of a hermit and not be seen by anyone.
10 TRAVAUX DE LA COMMISSION DE R]FORME DU CODE CIVIL 1950-1951 (Works of the Commis-
sion of the Reform of the Civil Code) at 36.
" Id. at 60.
" Id. at 72.
" Judgment of Mar. 18, 1966, Trib. Con., Seine [1966] Dalloz-Sirey, Jurisprudence [D.S.
Jur.] 566. A similar statement was made by the tribunal in a companion case, Judgment of
Mar. 18, 1966, Trib. Con., Seine [1966 D.S. Jur. 566.
4 Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Hsiv. L. REv. 193 (1890).
15 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902) (Gray, J., dissenting).
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decisions, distinguished the two situations. Although asserting that taking
photographs without the previous consent of the subject may have the
characteristics of "a species of aggression," Gray conceded that this could
be "an irremediable and irrepressible feature of the social evolution." On
the other hand, he saw "an act of invasion of the individual's privacy" in
their "commercial or other uses for gain.""6
MEDICAL CASES
A cause cglbre on unauthorized photographs in France involved the
son of a famous movie star, G6rard Philippe, and his parents. The boy, 9
years old, had been taken to a hospital to undergo emergency treatment.
A few photographers succeeded in gaining access to his room and in spite
of the fright and protestations of the young patient, took a number of
pictures, which were alleged to have severely aggravated the boy's condi-
tion. A few days later, one of the photographs appeared in the weekly
France-Dimanche, together with other pictures of the boy and his par-
ents. They were published along with a report about the state of health of
the child which, incidentally, was inaccurate. In order to promote the sale
of the weekly, posters representing him with his deceased father were dis-
played in various places.
The boy's mother, Madame Philippe, brought an action against the
publishing company, in her own name and that of her son, asking the
court to order an immediate seizure of the weekly and the posters in sum-
mary proceedings. She obtained the relief requested, and defendant
brought an appeal, claiming that the press printed other articles about
the sickness of the boy, that the write-up in question was laudatory re-
garding Madame Philippe, and that most of the photographs used had
been published previously. The Court of Appeals of Paris affirmed, re-
jecting the arguments of the defendant as irrelevant (sans intgrgt) and
terming the publication of the pictures and of the article, with a "purely
commercial purpose," as an "intolerable interference with the private life
of the Philippe family. '17
The defendant continued to litigate, taking the case to the Cour de
Cassation. The highest court affirmed, emphasizing both the commercial
purpose of the appellant and the fact that the reproduction of the pic-
tures was made from "unauthorized negatives." The finding of "intolera-
ble interference" was left undisturbed, and the measures ordered by the
court below were held to be proper in summary proceedings as necessary
"to mitigate damages to all possible extent."'
" Id. at 563, 64 N.E. at 450 (Gray, J., dissenting).
" Judgment of Mar. 13, 1965, Cour d' appel [1965] J.C.P. II 14223; 1966 GAz. PAL. I 38.
,S Judgment of July 12, 1966, Cass. civ., 2nd Ch., Fr. [1968] J.C.P. II 15503.
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It is difficult to disagree with the result of the case, but a few com-
ments suggest themselves. First, the theory of the summary proceedings
is that only provisional measures should be taken which would not
prejudice the rights of the parties after their difficulties are decided on
the merits. This principle risks violation in a case like Philippe. Indeed, if
the decision on the merits should be for the defendant, the seizure of his
periodical at an earlier date would have been an irreparable and unwar-
ranted injury. Second, in reaching their decision, the courts pointed out
that the conduct of the defendant was "intolerable"-a counterpart of
the common American requirement that the invasion of privacy be "seri-
ous" in order to become actionable.
Among the hundreds of American privacy cases,1 9 there are some in-
volving surreptitious photographs of sick or deformed people. The great
majority of them involve the question of publication. One of the best
known is Barber v. Time,1° in which the defendants were held liable for
taking and publishing photographs of the plaintiff in a hospital where she
went to be treated for an unusual condition. She was suffering from an
unsatiable appetite and could not stop eating even though she was quite
overweight. In spite of having eaten enough to feed a family of ten, she
had lost twenty-five pounds in the year before she was admitted to the
hospital. One of the defendant's reporters took her photograph while the
other was trying to persuade her to consent to publicity. It may be in-
ferred that plaintiff objected to the very taking of the photograph, but
the gist of the action revolved around publicity, which was given in the
defendant's magazine under the caption: "Starving Glutton". The court's
holding for the plaintiff was laid on the ground that the right of privacy
ought to protect a person from publication of a picture taken without
consent while ill or in bed.
In Clayman v. Bernstein,'1 the defendant physician took the hospi-
talized plaintiff's photographs while she was in a.semiconscious condition
without her permission, in order to record for his files the facial disfigura-
tion that resulted from her illness. The plaintiff brought a bill in equity
to enjoin the physician from developing or making prints of these photo-
graphs, from using the prints in any manner whatsoever, and also to di-
rect him to turn over the undeveloped films, negatives, and prints to the
plaintiff. It was averred in the bill that upon being informed of the action
of the defendant, the plaintiff "suffered mental pain and anguish" and
For a recent treatment of the development of the right to privacy in the United States,
see Wagner, The Right to Privacy and its Limitations in the U.S.A., in LAW IN THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA IN SOCIOLOGICAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTION 491 (Hazard & Wag-
ner, eds. 1974).
'0 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291 (1942).
11 38 Pa. D. & C. 543 (Ct. C.P. Phil. County 1940).
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became "distressed and disturbed mentally from the reaction knowing
that the photographs [were] in existence and in possession of defendant,
who [had] refused to deliver them to plaintiff upon her request." 2
In ruling for the plaintiff, the court stated that "[wlidespread distri-
bution of a photograph is not essential nor can it be said that publication
in its common usage or in its legal meaning is necessary"2 for liability.
The court continued:
Plaintiff's picture was taken without her authority or consent. Her right to
decide whether her facial characteristics should be recorded for another's
benefit or by reason of another's capriciousness has been violated. The
scope of the authorization defines the extent of the acts necessary to consti-
tute a violation. If plaintiff had consented to have her photograph taken
only for defendant's private files certainly he would have no right to exhibit
it to others without her permission. Can it be said that his rights are equally
extensive when even that limited consent has not been given? 2'4
The decree for the plaintiff was corroborated by the defendant's
''presumptive intent not only to develop the film but to print the negative
and exhibit the print,"' 5 since he contended that "he not only had the
right to take the picture but also to make reasonable use of the prints
...for the purposes of medical instruction."2 The court concluded that
in the present state of the law physicians have no "right to photograph
their patients without their consent,"'" and it therefore afforded the relief
prayed for, since "[t]he remedy afforded must be such as to destroy the
roots of the evil and this can only be done by mandatory injunction."' 8
Commenting on the doctor-patient relationship, one writer reached
the concusion that "a legal consent should be obtained from the patient
before a photograph is taken. '2 9
A case similar to the medical 'treatment situation was McAndrews v.
Roy,30 a Louisiana case in which the plaintiff's photographs were taken,
with his consent, before and after he took a physical improvement course
from the defendant. They were published approximately 10 years later.
The plaintiff recovered $1,000 for the invasion of his privacy on the
ground that it was unreasonable to publish the pictures after the lapse of
22 Id. at 544.
'2 Id. at 546.
Id. at 547.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 547-48.
17 Id. at 548.
"' Id. at 550.
"9 Challener, The Doctor-Patient Relationship and the Right to Privacy, 11 U. PITT. L.
REv. 624, 629 (1950).
30 131 So. 2d 256 (La. App. 1961).
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such a long time without asking for the extension of his consent.
The test of reasonableness has also been applied in other Louisiana
cases. Thus, an insurer has been found unreasonable in publishing a pho-
tograph of an insured, with his name, address, and telephone, in order to
obtain more information about an accident."1 In Bazemore v. Savannah
Hospitals" it was held that the plaintiffs had a valid cause of action where
the defendants, who were permitted to take a photograph, published a
picture of the plaintiff's child, born with its heart on the outside of its
body, in a nude condition without the permission of the parents.-s
In a New York case, Griffin v. Medical Society,s" the defendant phy-
sicians took the plaintiff's photographs before and after the treatment
and published them in a medical journal without the plaintiff's consent.
The court denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that the article,
"even in a scientific publication, may be nothing more than someone's
advertisement in disguise."3 5 The court stated that the article in question
could have been published to advertise the physicians and their handi-
work. Therefore, the use of the plaintiff's photograph could be found to
have been for advertising or purposes of trade, thus fitting within the
prohibitions of the New York statute.
Of course, the doctor-patient relationship is delicate and confidential.
Usually, if photographs of patients are taken, it is done with their con-
sent, and it is usually understood that the photographs are taken only for
the physician's files to illustrate the case history of the patient's condi-
3' Hamilton v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 82 So. 2d 61 (La. App. 1955), noted in Camp-
bell, Torts and Workmen's Compensation, 16 LA. L. REV. 267, 275 (1956). It has been said
that in Louisiana there is a distinction between two types of invasion of privacy: actual and
actionable. Recovery is granted only for the latter, which is found to exist if the defendant
acted unreasonably. "This test contemplates a balancing of the defendant's interest in pur-
suing his course of conduct against the plaintiff's interest in having his privacy protected
from serious invasions." Comment, The Right of Privacy in Louisiana, 28 LA. L. REV. 469,
477 (1968). From the angle of reasonableness one commentator supports encroachments on
privacy, positing "that most people will not only expect, but will welcome encroachments
within 'reasonable' bounds as part of their acquiring a segment of societal responsibility."
Slough, Privacy, Freedom, and Responsibility, 16 U. KAN. L. REV. 323, 323 (1968). That
people welcome the violation of their rights does not seem to be realistic, however, as it
disregards the frequent tendency of the American to bring actions whether injured or not as
long as there is a slight possibility of success. In any event, it does not seem that in practical
application the Louisiana view is different from the prevailing American approach that the
law prohibit only serious invasions of privacy. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 867 (1939).
2 171 Ga. 257, 155 S.E. 194 (1930).
33 But see Waters v. Fleetwood, 212 Ga. 161, 91 S.E.2d 344 (1956). The Waters court held
that publication of a picture of a murdered child's body without permission of the parents
was a matter of public interest and did not violate the mother's right of privacy. Id. at 165,
91 S.E.2d at 348.
3 7 Misc. 2d 549, 11 N.Y.S.2d 109 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1939).
*1 Id. at 550, 11 N.Y.S.2d at 110.
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tion. If there is an intention to publish them, even by the authorities such
as the New York State Department of Health, according to the restrictive
statute in New York, written consent of the subjects should first be ob-
tained. 36 The scope of such consent cannot be extended. For example, if
consent is given to take and to use motion pictures of a caesarean section
for medical societies, there could be liability if the film is exhibited in
public theatres.8 7
PHOTOGRAPHY INVOLVING JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
The very taking of photographs may be prohibited in rare situations,
and in particular, in the courtroom. Probably, the first reported American
case in which it was held that a court has the power to prohibit court-
room photographs and punish the violators by contempt of court proceed-
ings was Ex Parte Sturm.3s There, no mention was made of privacy, but
an announcement of the judge stated that photographs will not be per-
mitted because of the requirements of both judicial dignity and the fact
that the prisoner "is not able . . . to protect himself, and he will be pro-
tected by this court from any publicity of that character." 8' The court
added that "[t]he liberty of the press does not include the privilege of
taking advantage of the incarceration of a person accused of crime to
photograph his face and figure against his will.
4 0
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure state that "[t]he taking of
photographs in the courtroom during the progress of judicial proceedings
• . . shall not be permitted 1"," and similar regulations have been
adopted by many courts throughout the country. Their validity has been
sustained.4 2 The Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure ban the taking of
photographs and motion pictures in the courtroom during trials.48 A
" Challener, supra note 29, at 628 (citing Opinion of the Attorney General of New York 374
(1934)).
37 Feeney v. Young, 191 App. Div. 501, 181 N.Y.S. 481 (1st Dep't 1920).
- 152 Md. 114, 136 A. 312 (1927).
3, Id. at 116-17, 136 A. at 313.
40 Id. at 120, 136 A. at 314.
11 FED. R. CRIM. P. 53.
1 See, e.g., In re The Florida Bar-Code of Judicial Conduct, 281 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1973). A
new code of judicial conduct was reported by the court, Canon 3 subd. A(7) of which prohib-
its, inter alia, photographs in the courtroom with some exceptions. Id. at 25.
43 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, Rule 223(b) (Purdon Supp. 1975-1976). The mandatory rule, en-
acted in 1938 and amended in 1971, provides, in part:
The taking of photographs in the courtroom or its environs or radio or television
broadcasting from the courtroom or its environs during the progress of or in connec-
tion with any judicial proceedings, whether or not the court is actually in session, is
prohibited. The environs of the courtroom is defined as the area immediately sur-
rounding the entrances and exits to the courtroom.
Id. The most evident purpose of such a prohibition is to protect judicial proceedings from
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Westmoreland County rule of court" extended the prohibition to "any
place in the courthouse within forty feet of the entrance to any court-
room" and to prisoners or inmates of the county jail as long as they are in
the jail or on the way to or from a session of court.'5 The rule also re-
quires consent of the subjects in other situations:
No pictures or photographs of any party to a civil or criminal action, juror
or witness, shall be taken in the law library or in any office or other room of
the courthouse, except with the knowledge and consent of the person or
persons photographed."6
In In re Mack,'47 seven press photographers violated the prohibition
by taking and then publishing photographs of a convicted murderer on
his way from the county jail to a courtroom. Even though the pictures
were taken by means of infrared rays not requiring the use of flash bulbs
and causing no commotion or noise, the defendants were convicted, and
this result was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Calling
the proceeding a "test case," however, it modified the sentences by strik-
ing provisions for imprisonment and leaving merely the imposition of
fines and costs. Besides the necessity of maintaining the dignity of'the
courts, the court emphasized the duty of the fiduciary "to protect the
right of privacy of the prisoner."'" Of course, in the great majority of situ-
ations, persons who take pictures of those involved in court proceedings
are professional photographers whose livelihoods require publishing the
photographs. However, the Westmoreland rules and regulations make no
exceptions and relate to everyone, including individuals who might wish
to take pictures for their own pleasure and files. Given such a prohibition,
the question arises whether the law should protect the privacy of
criminals or suspected criminals to a greater degree than that of an aver-
age citizen on the street, who would not be protected from uninvited pic-
ture taking.49
disturbances, but the rule is broader than that and applies even if no trouble is threatened.
Thus, its beneficiary is the right of privacy.
", WESTMORELAND COUNTY CT. R. 6084(a).
48 Id. 6084(d).
" Id. 6084(c).
" 386 Pa. 251, 126 A.2d 679 (1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1002 (1957).
" Id. at 259, 126 A.2d at 683.
41 In a separate opinion in Mack, Justice Bell argued that regulations prohibiting the
photographing of prisoners "not near the Courtroom" should be held invalid, since persons
charged with or convicted of crimes do lose their privacy to some extent and become public
figures. Id. at 266, 126 A.2d at 686 (Bell, J., dissenting in part).
A strong and lengthy dissent was delivered by Justice Musmanno who stressed the free-
dom of press section of the Pennsylvania constitution and the discreet manner in which the
defendant acted. Justice Musmanno also noted the extensive and justified public interest in
the notorious killer, reasoning "that party litigants and witnesses do not expect the isolation
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The constitutionality of restrictions on taking photographs in courts
was challenged in Mack and in a few other cases on the ground that they
violate the freedom of press guaranteed by the first and fourteenth
amendments, as well as the federal Civil Rights Act. In a federal case, the
court did not agree, saying that a partial abridgement of civil rights is
permitted in the interest of public order.50 The court stated that the
courts have the duty "to protect the right of an accused's privacy" by "all
reasonable means" ' and added:
Undoubtedly, such right of privacy is to be subordinated at least to the
extent of permitting a limited scrutiny, to the public interest in obtaining
information . . . . [T]he constitutional right of the accused to a public trial
is a privilege intended for his benefit. It does not entitle the press or the
public to take advantage of his involuntary exposure at the bar of justice to
employ photographic means to picture his plight in the toils of the law ei-
ther while in jail, going or coming from court or while actually in the
courtroom.12
The reference of the court to the "press or the public" may be under-
stood that the court read the rule literally and felt that the accused
should be protected not only against the publication of his likeness in the
press, but also against a possible taking of his photograph for private
use.
53
A few other texts express the same idea. Canon 35 of the American
Bar Association's Canons of Judicial Ethics states as follows:
Proceedings in court shall be conducted with fitting dignity and decorum.
The taking of photographs in the courtroom, during sessions of the court or
recesses between sessions, and the broadcasting or televising of court pro-
ceedings detract from the essential dignity of the proceedings, distract par-
ticipants and witnesses in giving testimony, and create misconceptions with
respect thereto in the mind of the public and should not be permitted.
tion and privacy of their homes when they enter a courthouse .... [T]he public has the
right to know what is transpiring." Id. at 287-88, 126 A.2d at 697 (Musmanno, J., dissent-
ing). Musmanno believed that "the defendants are entitled to an outright acquittal [as]
[t]hey [have] performed an act of public service." Id. at 298, 126 A.2d at 702 (Musmanno, J.,
dissenting). The dissenting justice pointed out that the rule of the Westmoreland County
court was "an anomaly in Pennsylvania," where the prevailing approach is that photographs
may be taken "anywhere in the courthouse except in courtrooms actually in court session."
Id. at 304, 126 A.2d at 705 (Musmanno, J., dissenting).
50 Tribune Review Pub. Co. v. Thomas, 153 F. Supp. 486, 493 (W.D. Pa. 1957).
5' Id. at 495.
52 Id.
*1 Court power to prohibit the taking of photographs of a prisoner in a courtroom and on
the way to or from the court and to institute contempt proceedings in case of a violation has
been upheld. See, e.g., Brumfield v. State, 108 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 1958); Atlanta Newspapers,
Inc. v. Grimes, 216 Ga. 74, 114 S.E.2d 421, appeal dismissed, 364 U.S. 290 (1960).
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A 1964 Pennsylvania survey showed that when photographing in the
courtroom was permitted and was carried out inconspicuously, those par-
ticipating in the proceedings "who were unaware of what was going on
• . . objected strongly and some of them said that they never would vol-
untarily appear in court again" when they saw their pictures in the news-
papers.5" Of course, this results from the use of the photographs rather
than from merely taking them. These situations in which someone would
be interested in taking pictures in court just in order to keep them in his
own archives are unlikely to arise frequently. The ban on photographing
in court, where it exists, is general-it covers newspaper reporters as well
as any other persons.5
The reasons frequently given against restrictions on any kind of pub-
licity about trials do not impress many courts and rulemakers to the ex-
tent of their giving up any controls. Among these reasons, it has been
asserted that "the presence, or the possible presence, of members of the
general public is a guarantee of the fairness of the trial"8 and
that-according to arguments advanced by the media of communica-
tions-there is "the public's right to know."'5 7 This argument seems to be
weak. Indeed, the unlimited "right of the public to know" as advanced in
recent years has resulted in irreparable harm to the United States and to
the interests of some of its citizens. The press penetrates everywhere and
publishes every bit of information it is able to secure, irrespective of the
vital interests of the country. Spying is hardly necessary any longer, be-
cause most classified information is made public by "leaks," condoned on
the ground of the imaginary "right to know." In the private litigation sec-
tor this "right" has been criticized on the ground that it may amount
simply to entertaining people at the expense of others, as by publicizing a
sex trial, or to feeding the public with news in which there is no legiti-
mate interest, as in tax cases.58
It has been said that the use of a camera is a lawful activity and that
the citizens' privilege to take pictures is a civil right protected by the
Constitution, although it may sometimes be made unlawful by a statute."
A rule of a court may be a substitute for a statutory prohibition, but the
courts do not have to take advantage of their regulatory power. Thus, in a
1948 case, a trial revealed some scandalous occurrences in the parties' do-
Hockenberry, Pennsylvania's Courtroom Ban on Camera Equipment, 36 PA. B.A.Q. 76,
79 (1964). It was also stated that photographing would disrupt the proceedings, tempting
participants to pose for photographs. Id.
M/d.
Winters, Privacy Right Affects Litigation Process Role, 17 VA. L. WKLY. No. 7 (1964).
7 Id. Winters expounds that in many cases the public has no real interest at stake or right
to be entertained. Id.
.Id"
" United States v. Gugel, 119 F. Supp. 897, 898 (E.D. Ky. 1954).
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mestic life. Despite objections, the defendant took photographs of the
plaintiff while he was in the courtroom during a recess in a divorce and
custody proceeding, and later published the photographs. In a subsequent
lawsuit, the court held for the defendant stating that when involved in a
lawsuit, the plaintiff was forced, by the circumstances, "to throw aside
the mantle of privacy" and become a "quasi-public figure."60 He was "an
actor in an occurrence of public interest" and could not complain when a
story and photographs about him were published as legitimate news
items.6 The court noted that a "picture . . . in the courtroom does not
add to, nor detract from, whatever right [the plaintiff] may have to re-
cover .. . [since] [t]here is no rule . . . which prohibits the taking of
photographs in the courtroom when the judge is not on the bench. ' '" 2
It may be noted that a rather fargoing English statute, the Criminal
Justice Act of 1925, prohibits not only the taking of photographs in any
court but also the making of portraits or sketches of any person involved
in the proceedings with a view toward publication. The prohibition covers
the courtroom, the buildings, and the precincts of the buildings." On the
other hand, with the growing emphasis on "freedom of information" in
America, a few states recently decided to permit court photographing.
Following the view of Alabama and Colorado, Washington decided to take
the liberal approach. The supreme court of that state removed a previous
ban, and as of September 1976, newsmen are allowed to photograph and
tape record trials in progress.6"
STREET PHOTOGRAPHS
Photographs can often be taken inconspicuously on the public street.
Very frequently, photographs are used to promote a defendant's business.
The first famous privacy cases, decided either for the defendant or plain-
tiff involved such situations." Frequently, defendants are treated more
severely in such cases. The statutory protection of privacy in New York"
and a few other states is granted only for invasions for commercial use.
Thus, one New York court expressed the lenient view in force in its juris-
diction when stating that "[e]ven private social affairs and prevailing
fashions involving individuals who make no bid for publicity are, by cus-
" Berg v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 79 F. Supp. 957, 961 (D. Minn. 1948).
1 Id. at 961.
"' Id. at 962.
3 The English Criminal Justice Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c.86, § 41(1).
" Detroit News, Sept. 22, 1976.
" Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905); Roberson v. Roch-
ester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 164 N.E. 442 (1902).
00 N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50 & 51 (McKinney 1976 & Supp. 1979-1980); see text accom-
panying note 81, infra.
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tom, regarded as public property, where the apparent use is to convey
information of interest and not mere advertising."'6 7 On the other hand, in
the early case of Kunz v. Allen," the plaintiff complained that defen-
dants took "moving picture films . . .of her face, form, and garments"
without her knowledge and claimed that this amounted to "an invasion of
her private rights for which she was entitled to recover." 9 The Supreme
Court of Kansas ruled for the plaintiff even though she did not prove any
actual damages. 71 In the opinion, the fact that defendants used the mo-
tion pictures to advertise their business, by showing them in a theatre,
was emphasized: they had represented plaintiff while she was shopping in
the defendants' dry goods store. This was a rather progressive decision. In
similar situations, a few French courts suggested that the defendant
should delete the faces of potential plaintiffs to avoid liability, but such a
suggestion does not seem to have been accepted by American courts.
The restrictive New York approach is a reflection of the traditional
common law failure to recognize privacy as a right. This is still the situa-
tion in England, where the assertion by Judge Horridge, made 60 years
ago, is still good law:
In my judgment, no one possesses a right of preventing another person's
photographing him any more than he has a right of preventing another per-
son's giving a description of him, provided the description is not libelous or
otherwise wrongful. Those rights do not exist.7 '
Agreeing with this approach, a commentator in 1932 stated that pro-
tection against the taking of photographs seemed to. be practically impos-
sible, and that anyone may take another's picture on any occasion that
presents itself. Protection would be given solely against the use made of
the photographs. The use of another's photograph is permitted, according
to the cases, as long as it is not connected with commerce, trade, or busi-
ness. "Cases involving uses such as those of personal satisfaction, decora-
tion of private rooms or homes, have not arisen. These are appropriations
against which society does not yet demand protection. '" The author as-
serted that if someone wants to be protected from being photographed,
he must take proper steps to prevent it, because "[t]he photographer has
open season on all who expose themselves to public view."78
17 Martin v. New Metropolitan Fiction, Inc., 139 Misc. 290, 292, 248 N.Y.S. 359, 362 (Sup.
Ct. Rensselaer County 1931).
8 102 Kan. 883, 172 P. 532 (1918).
69 Id. at 883, 172 P. at 532.
70 Id. at 884, 172 P. at 532.
71 Sports and Gen. Press Agency, Ltd. v. "Our Dogs" Pub. Co. [19161 2 K.B. 880 (C.A.)
(cited in Green, The Right of Privacy, 27 ILL. L. REv. 237, 244 n.24 (1932)).
72 Green, supra note 71, at 244, 245.
71 Id. at 246.
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Most humans, however, must appear in the public, whether they like
it or not. Complications may result. Let us first examine a few situations
that arose in French courts.
An interesting case was decided in 1963.7 1 A married couple, the Vil-
lards, sued a periodical. The husband, a professor of physical education,
was sent by the French Government to Rome for the Olympic Games. On
the way back, accompanied by his wife, a member of the same profession,
he stopped in Pisa. They were photographed on the background of the
famous leaning tower in scanty dress, which was due, according to their
explanation, to very hot weather.
The photograph was published by the weekly Le Petit Echo de la
Mode, which unfavorably commented on the married couple's attire and
branded it as excessively bare and ridiculous. The names of the plaintiffs
were not given, but they were recognized by many persons, some of
whom, particularly colleagues and parents of their students, sent letters
expressing their disapproval and astonishment over this publicity, which
tended to undermine the prestige of the educators in the eyes of the
young generation and injure the standing of the profession.
The plaintiffs, contending that the publication of the photograph was
made without their knowledge and consent, asked for damages, including
some for mental suffering and some based on the fact that the plaintiff
husband did not receive a position for which he had applied.
The defendant company answered by stating that the photograph
had been taken with the plaintiffs' consent and pointed out that its publi-
cation served the company's campaign against undesirable attire, since it
showed the plaintiffs wearing revolting clothes and well illustrated an ar-
ticle which appeared in the weekly. The defendant contended that the
sale of the photograph was known to the plaintiffs, and that if it had been
reproduced with favorable comments, they would certainly not have
thought about advancing any objections.
The tribunal found that the plaintiffs gave their consent to the tak-
ing of the picture. The publication of the photograph, however, presented
another question:
[B]y virtue of a legal principle laid down by a series of judicial decisions,
the person photographed has an absolute property right in his likeness and
the use of it, and nobody can take advantage of it without his consent ....
[I]n lack of such consent, reproduction ... amounts to a wrong which gen-
erates damages calling for a redress.75
The effects of the unauthorized publication of the photograph were
aggravated, said the tribunal, by the unfavorable comments. While agree-
71 Judgment of Feb. 26, 1963, Trib. con., Seine, [1963] J.C.P. II 13364.
75 Id.
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ing with the plaintiffs that recovery should be granted and that it should
include damages for mental disturbance, the tribunal refused to take into
consideration the lost expectancy of obtaining a desired appointment,
finding it purely conjectural.
The judgment was modified by the Court of Appeals of Paris 7 6 which
took a different view of the problem. The conclusion of the defendant's
liability was the same, but for other grounds, and the amount of damages
was greatly reduced. The court expressed a liberal view of the rights to
publish photographs taken in public places, and emphasized some fea-
tures of the case not discussed by the tribunal below. It took a more leni-
ent approach towards publishers than that taken by some other courts.
In contrast to the tribunal below, the court of appeals expressed its
own opinion about the plaintiffs' dress. It found that their attire "had no
features which could offend the public morality."'7 7 Yet, because of its
scantiness it could justify criticism, which was actually formulated in
moderate terms by the journalist, and the article did not question either
the usual dressing habits of the plaintiffs, in periods other than during
vacations, or their behavior.
The court proceeded to lay down the rules it deemed proper and ap-
plicable to the facts presented:
[B]y lingering in a public place, the spouses Villard exposed themselves to
the sight of everyone and . . .they cannot complain if someone, availing
himself of the same right, found himself at the same spot and looked at
them or even retained, by the means of ... a camera, the scene which they
were offering to the sights in front of a public monument which numerous
tourists are constantly photographing; ... their presence before this monu-
ment could not give them the excessive right to prevent any pictures being
taken; . . . the right to reproduce a photograph in the press must be admit-
ted as long as it has been taken in a public place;. . . the plaintiffs did not
try to hide themselves from the scene in question, and they were not sud-
denly placed, by an interplay of unforeseen circumstances, against their
wishes, in a disagreeable and ridiculous situation."s
If the right to publish photographs taken in public places is so broad,
how could the Villard court find the defendants liable? The exercise of a
right, reasoned the court, must be carried out "with prudence which has
roots in the endeavor of doing nothing which could expose another to
criticism and mockery of those who surround him," provided that special
circumstances, such as an offense against public morality, do not warrant
71 Judgment of Mar. 24, 1965, Cour d' appel, Paris, [1965] J.C.P. II 14305.
77 One commentator observed that the Villard court was inconsistent by charging the plain-
tiffs with lack of prudence in the selection of their dress while stating that they could not
offend the public morality. Nerson, supra note 5, at 68.
71 Judgment of Mar. 24, 1965, Cour d' appel, Paris, [1965] J.C.P. II 14305.
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a farther-going attitude. This prudence, said the court, was not shown by
the defendant, who published "only a part of the photograph, which has
the effect of attracting the attention of the reader. . . on the couple rep-
resented," and "did not take any measures by which the spouses Villard
could not be recognized." This lack of prudence amounted to a fault
which engaged the liability of the defendant.
This liability, however, should be mitigated, according to the court,
by the "bad taste" of the plaintiffs, which they displayed by showing
themselves to public view and taking photographs in attire the impropri-
ety of which could not escape attention. Thus, the Villard's lack of pru-
dence contributed to the wrong they sustained, a wrong which the court
found as not serious and for which it granted to each of the plaintiffs the
amount of 200 F.
It does not appear that a reported case on the same facts as those in
the Villard case was ever decided by an American court. The closest was
the contemporaneous New York case of La Forge v. Fairchild Publica-
tions, Inc."9 In La Forge, the defendants published a story entitled "Fash-
ion Follows a Pattern" and illustrated it by photographs taken at a race
track of persons wearing short jackets of a particular material. They were
not identified, nor were they asked to express consent to the publication.
The writeup stated that the fabric of the jackets was a "runaway
fashion."
Plaintiff, whose photograph was one among the others which had
been published, complained of the invasion of his privacy. Reversing an
order denying defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint for legal in-
sufficiency, the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court held
that, according to the law of the state, the plaintiff's rights had not been
violated. New York is one of the few American jurisdictions in which the
law of privacy has been reduced to writing, and, even if the relevant pro-
vision is broadly construed by the courts, the scope of protection granted
to privacy is less comprehensive than in most jurisdictions."0 The statute
grants relief to "any person whose name, portrait or picture is used...
for advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade without. . . written
consent . . . ."8 The La Forge court stated that the statutory require-
ments had not been met, since the article was on a matter of public inter-
79 23 App. Div. 2d 636, 257 N.Y.S.2d 127 (1st Dep't 1965) (per curiam).
80 But see Galella v. Onassis, 353 F. Supp. 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) aff'd in part and modified in
part, 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973). The district court, applying New York law, suggested that
a common law right of privacy could be found by the New York Court of Appeals. Cf. Nader
v. General Motors Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 560, 255 N.E.2d 765, 307 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1970) (New
York court applied District of Columbia privacy law). The Galella court expressed the opin-
ion that the New York Court of Appeals would not follow the Roberson case today. 353 F.
Supp. at 229.
81 N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (McKinney Supp. 1979-1980).
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est, and the photographs were related to it rather than being "direct, con-
cealed [or] subtle advertising. '"8 2
Another interesting French case involving the taking of street photo-
graphs and their use without the subjects' consent is Andrieu v. Later.8 3
Defendant took two photographs at a horse market. The views repre-
sented the animals and some persons, including the plaintiffs, who did
not know that the pictures had been taken. The scenes were subsequently
used for the manufacture of postcards. Dismissing the complaint, the
court stated that
it is in vain that one could look for a legal basis on which a prohibition...
to make reproductions of scenes photographed on the street or a public
square could be rested; . . . if the right of an individual to prohibit the
reproduction of his likeness taken in private may be justified, there is no
similar justification as to photographs taken on a public way . . . . [The
likeness of an individual on the street is subjected to the view of all, and all
that the drawing or the photograph do is to fix it in a permanent way;...
there is no legal provision limiting those views or prohibiting such a fixation
or such a reproduction; . . . in these circumstances the representation of
individuals by a drawing or a photograph falls into the category of normal
servitudes of our life in the society and cannot be prohibited more than
descriptive reports, by the way of press, of the presence of the individual in
the same circumstances.84
Consequently, it was held that the plaintiffs could not recover as they
were photographed on a public square. The same result was reached on
the reproduction of the picture. The court emphasized the lack of injury,
the absence of wrongful intention, and the fact that the physiognomies of
the plaintiffs were difficult to recognize and were lost in a group of other
persons.8 5 It may be noticed that, contrary to the Villard case,86 the
82 23 App. Div. 2d at 636, 257 N.Y.S.2d at 128. In Neff v. Time, Inc., 406 F. Supp. 858 (W.D.
Pa. 1976), the court found for the defendant where a football fan was photographed with the
zipper of his trousers open. The picture was published in a sports magazine in connection
with an article about football fans. The plaintiff claimed invasion of privacy, adding that he
had been exposed to ridicule, injury to his esteem, and mental and emotional distress. The
Neff court recognized that the photograph was deliberately selected for publication by an
editorial committee from a number of similar pictures. While the court admitted that it had
"some misgivings," it held that "the publication of Neff's photograph taken with his active
encouragement and participation, and with knowledge that the photographer was connected
with a publication, even though taken without his express consent, is protected by the Con-
stitution." Id. at 862.
83 1932 GAZ. PAL. I 855.
84 Id.
88 One commentator greeted the decision as setting a proper limitation on the prohibition of
reproducing an individual's likeness. A publication will be permitted if the picture does not
amount to a "portrait" but represents a scene of public life and the individual has been
photographed in a group and is hardly recognizable-at least if the defendant did not act
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plaintiffs were not specifically the subject of the picture. On the other
hand, no consent had been given by the photographed persons.
An American case similar to Villard arose when a married couple,
who, like the plaintiffs in the French case, had been photographed, alleg-
edly without their consent, at the famous Farmers' Market in Los Ange-
les. The picture represented the plaintiffs sitting at a counter in their ice
cream establishment, the husband with his arm around his wife. The pho-
tograph was published in a journal as an illustration of an article entitled
"Love" in which one of the defendants described various kinds of rela-
tions between persons of opposite sex. The article attributed to the plain-
tiffs (without revealing their names) feelings based on mere intense sex
attraction, with negligible affection and respect. This kind of love was
branded as wrong. Most probably, the plaintiffs would not have objected
to the publication of the photograph itself, but they complained that the
article "depicted them as loose, dissolute, and immoral persons," which
held them up to "public scorn, ridicule, hatred, contempt and obloquy"
and which resulted in their loss of business and injury in social contacts,
reputation and health. Clearly, those allegations were classic statements
in any case of defamation, but plaintiffs claimed that their right of pri-
vacy had been invaded.
The two cases brought against the several defendants who took the
photographs, wrote the article, and permitted their publication reached
the Supreme Court of California.
From the pronouncements of the courts in the case brought against
Hearst Publishing Co.,8 7 it appears that the final view taken in California
is that not only may street photographers take pictures, but their publica-
tion is permitted as well. The California Supreme Court did not find any
"actionable invasion of plaintiffs' right of privacy," since it gave priority
to considerations of "public interest in the dissemination of news and in-
formation consistent with the democratic processes under the constitu-
tional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press."88 The publica-
tion in question was found to have "no particular news value but was
designed to serve the function of entertainment as a matter of legitimate
public interest," 89 and as such, it should be protected. In reaching this
conclusion, the court emphasized several elements. First, "the right of
privacy is determined by the norm of the ordinary man," so that if the
maliciously. Exception should be made for groups photographed only because of the pres-
ence of a certain person; in such a situation, the photograph could be assimilated to a por-
trait, and that it was taken on a public street should not be important. Id.
" Judgment of Feb. 26, 1963, Trib. con., Seine, [1963] J.C.P. II 13364.
8 Gill v. Hearst Pub. Co., 40 Cal. 2d 224, 253 P.2d 441 (1953) (en banc).
88 Id. at 228, 253 P.2d at 443.
8' Id. at 229, 253 P.2d at 444.
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publication does not appear offensive to persons "of ordinary sensibili-
ties," it will not be actionable."' Second, the photograph was not "surrep-
titiously snapped on private grounds, but. . . was taken of plaintiffs in a
pose voluntarily assumed in a public market place,"' thereby waiving
their right of privacy and placing the photographed incident in the "pub-
lic domain." Third, far from being "discreditable" and objectionable, the
photograph could be said "to be complimentary and pleasing in its picto-
rial representation of the plaintiffs." 2 Finally, the publication was not
"for advertising or trade purposes." 93 The Court rejected the right of in-
dividuals to prevent publication of any photograph taken without their
permission,9" which taken to its logical conclusion would result in the im-
possibility of publishing a photograph of a parade or a street scene.9 5
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Carter found it to be "obvious" that
there was no "news or educational value whatsoever in the photograph
alone, '"96 expressing the view that the publication of the photograph alone
violated the plaintiffs privacy.97 He "most emphatically" dissented from
the holding of the majority, reaffirming the approach taken by the court
in the same case before rehearing, in which he delivered the opinion for
the unanimous court. 
9
The hesitation shown by the court-the hearings, rehearings, and re-
versals, the dissenting and concurring opinions-indicate that the prob-
lem is difficult and its solution not well settled.
The other case, brought against Curtis Publishing Co., was hardly
go Id.
Id. at 230, 253 P.2d at 444.
92 Id. at 230-31, 253 P.2d at 445.
Id. at 231, 253 P.2d at 445.
Themo v. New England Newspaper Pub. Co., 306 Mass. 54, 27 N.E.2d 753 (1940). In
Themo, the defendant took the plaintiff's photograph without his consent, representing the
plaintiff in conversation with a police captain and published it on the front page of its news-
paper. The court held that "if" the right of privacy exists in Massachusetts, "it does not
protect one from having his name or his likeness appear in a newspaper when there is legiti-
mate public interest. ... Id. at 58, 27 N.E.2d at 755.
" RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 867, Comment c (1939).
'e 40 Cal. 2d at 232, 253 P.2d at 446 (Carter, J., dissenting in part).
97 Judge Carter stated:
By plaintiffs doing what they did in view of a tiny fraction of the public, does not
mean that they consented to observation by the millions of readers of the defendant's
magazine. In effect, the majority holding means that anything any one does outside of
his own home is with consent to the publication thereof, because ... he waives his
right of privacy . . . . If such were the case, the blameless exposure of a portion of
the naked body . . . as the result of inefficient buttons . . .could be freely photo-
graphed and . . . published . . ..
Id. at 232-33, 253 P.2d at 446 (Carter, J., dissenting in part).
" 239 P.2d 636 (Sup. Ct. Cal. 1952) (en banc), vacated, 40 Cal. 2d 224, 253 P.2d 441 (1953)
(en banc).
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less troublesome for the California courts.9 Here, the gist of the com-
plaint was against the publication of the article on love along with the
photograph. The final decision was that a cause of action had been stated.
The district court of appeals held that the alleged facts showed "an un-
warranted and unreasonable interference with appellant's interest in not
having their likeness exhibited in such a manner."'00 The supreme court
added that the article was susceptible to the construction placed thereon
by plaintiffs: that they were depicted "as dissolute and immoral per-
sons"10' whose "only interest in each other is sex."'102
Other jurisdictions have experienced similar difficulties in setting the
borderline between what should be permitted and what should not. The
New York statutory distinction has to be construed by the courts, which
usually tend to extend the scope of protection of privacy. In a 1955
case,' 0 3 the defendant published a photograph of some boys on a public
street to illustrate a story on gangs. Their assent to the taking of the
picture had been given, but they were not asked to express agreement to
the particular use of the photograph, which took place some time after it
had been taken. The court held that situation to be within the New York
statute and granted recovery for the plaintiffs' "flagrant violation" of pri-
vacy even though defamation seems to have been the essence of the
wrong the plaintiffs suffered.
STREET SCENES
In Blumenthal v. Picture Classics, Inc.,""4 the defendant produced
and distributed a motion picture entitled "Sight-Seeing in New York with
Nick and Tony." The exhibition of the film lasted for 17 minutes. During
6 seconds, the film showed the plaintiff, representing her in the act of
selling bread and rolls to passersby. In an action for an injunction, the
majority ruled in her favor. In a very short opinion, the court stated that
plaintiff was granted by the New York statute "an absolute right" to ob-
ject to the use of her picture for trade purposes, "even though her trade
brings her into public view." As the scene in which she appeared "was a
front view closeup of her and was intended to show her alone in the act of
vending her goods for sale,"' 0 5 she was entitled to relief. The two dissent-
ing justices pointed out that at no time did the plaintiff's picture appear
90 Gill v. Curtis Pub. Co., 38 Cal. 2d 273, 239 P.2d 630 (1952) (en banc).
100 Gill v. Curtis Pub. Co., 231 P.2d 565, 568 (Dist. Ct. App. 1951).
101 Gill v. Curtis Pub. Co., 38 Cal. 2d at 275, 239 P.2d at 635-36.
101 Id. at 279, 239 P.2d at 634.
lOS Metzger v. Dell Pub. Co., 207 Misc. 182, 136 N.Y.S.2d 888 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1955).
104 235 App. Div. 570, 257 N.Y.S. 800 (1st Dep't 1932), aff'd mem., 261 N.Y. 504, 185 N.E.
713 (1933).
10 235 App. Div. at 571, 257 N.Y.S. at 801.
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alone; it was just a usual reproduction of life in the town, so that the
motion picture was a newsreel rather than a photoplay which is a work of
fiction. The dissent concluded that the film should be protected as an
item of current events of public interest rather than a production for the
purposes of trade.
As the last case on this point, let us discuss Thayer v. Worcester Post
Co.,0 6 wherein plaintiff was photographed in a group of five persons at an
airport. She did not object, believing that her husband extended consent.
There was no evidence that the plaintiff agreed to have the photograph
published, but the court did not find that material, stating that a person
who posed for a photograph under the circumstances of the case had no
right to object to its publication, and continued:
There is nothing to indicate that so far as the plaintiff was concerned it was
taken for a private use or a restricted purpose . . . . The circumstances im-
posed no express or implied limitation by the plaintiff upon its publication
by the person owning it. The contention of the plaintiff in substance is that,
although she had no property right in the picture itself and the defendant
may have rightfully obtained property right in it and the right to publish it,
so far as the owner of the tangible basis for a picture can transfer it, yet she
has an absolute right not to have it published in the circumstances disclosed
without her consent. That contention cannot be supported.'0 7
The court took a lenient approach to the defendant's acts. Its deci-
sion is the more noteworthy because only a part of the photograph had
been published, thereby presenting the plaintiff in a specific light: out of
five persons including the plaintiff's husband who appeared on the origi-
nal picture, the defendant published only the plaintiff and her husband's
chauffeur. Denying the plaintiff's claim of invasion of privacy, the court
permitted a cause of action for a libelous writeup about marital scandals
of the plaintiff, illustrated by the photograph in question.
Further examination of cases will not bring in new elements. Both in
France and the United States the decision will depend on particular facts
of the situation, which sometimes may seem to be not very significant,
but which tip the scale in borderline cases. Of course, statutory enact-
ments may give some guidance.
Recent developments do not detract anything from the validity of
early observations by the French author Fougerol, made on the ground of
a few early French cases and his own analysis of the problem. 10 8 He dis-
tinguished two situations. In the first, the photographer intended to take
a picture of the public place itself, and some individuals just happened to.
10 284 Mass. 160, 187 N.E. 292 (1933).
07 Id. at 164, 187 N.E. at 293-94.
108 FOUGEROL, LA FIGURE HUMAINE ET LE DROIT (1913).
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be at the spot. The author would permit the use of such photographs,
limited by the right of the subjects to object. If they notify the photogra-
pher about their objections, their likenesses should be taken off or so ob-
literated as to render them unrecognizable.1 09
In the second situation, certain persons are the primary target of the
photographers. In the absence of their consent, the taking of the photo-
graphs is unlawful from the very outset, unless the persons in question
had participated in an overt activity, thereby abandoning the "monopoly"
to their likeness. In such a case, "their portrait belongs to history and to
current news."' 1 0 The exception does not extend to private ceremonies,
such as funerals or marriages.
For the sake of comparison, it may be mentioned that in West Ger-
many the courts have developed a "right of personality," similar to the
French concept, from some general provisions of the 1949 Constitution.'
Although until recently no reported case had prohibited the mere taking
of a photograph, a 1957 decision held that the secret taking and publica-
tion of a picture exceeds the privilege to report on matters of current
events." 2 On the ground of the approach of the judiciary, supplemented
by materials published in legal literature, the Ministry of Justice pre-
pared in 1958 a bill on "Protection of Personality and Honor," which in-
cluded a provision that "it is a wrongful injury. . . if somebody makes a
picture of another against the other's discernible will or, by making a pic-
ture, injures a legitimate interest of the person pictured.""' The draft
was approved by the upper chamber, but the lower house took no action,
largely because the statute would result in an abridgement of free
speech." 4
PROFESSIONAL STREET PHOTOGRAPHERS
Before amateur photography became as popular and widespread as it
is today, the number of photographs taken by tourists was small in com-
parison with those taken by professional street photographers who made
pictures of the passersby and offered to sell them copies at a profit.
Sometimes, their behavior was rather aggressive and gave rise to resent-
ment. The question arose whether they should be permitted to freely ex-
109 Id. at 62.
"0 Id. at 68.
"I Krause, The Right of Privacy in Germany-Pointers for American Legislation?, 1965
DUKE L.J. 481, 482.
--- 24 BGHZ 200 (1957). As the taking and publication were strictly connected, the holding
of the court cannot be understood as an authority on mere photographing. See Krause,
supra note 111, at 523.
"' Krause, supra note 111, at 492.
.. Id. at 495.
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ercise their trade, be subjected to some regulations and restraints, or be
simply barred from their activity on the ground it interfered with the
right of the citizens not to be photographed without previous consent.
Both above-mentioned restrictive approaches have been taken by the
French administrative authorities and have received some judicial
attention.
On the one hand, some good arguments could be advanced in support
of the unrestricted exercise of the profession. An early French statute11
proclaimed that "everyone is free to engage in such activity or to exercise
such profession, art or craft as he pleases," and the Law of July 16, 1912,
provided that itinerant merchants "shall not be subjected to any ex-
traordinary measures of general law, and in particular, to any exceptional
.prophylactic regulations . ,,116 Inquiries about the feelings of the gen-
eral public indicated that there was no prevailing discontent with respect
to street photographers. Neither satisfaction nor indifference was noted.
No instances of the use of photographs for blackmail were reported, and
negatives were destroyed upon the request of the person interested."1
On the other hand, it could be asserted that the photographers en-
cumber public passageways; that their activities bring about a risk of
public disorder in case someone is annoyed enough to display his objec-
tions in a violent way; that abuses might be perpetrated by photograph-
ing someone in an attire or in a company which could give rise to gossip
or disapproval by others. Even in the absence of such possibilities, profes-
sional street photography should be prohibited if the right to likeness
should be understood as necessitating previous consent before the very
taking of the photograph.1
Some support for the power of the administration to regulate street
photographing could be deduced from the French Article 97 of the Law of
April 5, 1884, which dealt with the police power and which assigned to
local authorities the task of assuring public order, security, and proper
health conditions. By virtue of the statute, this power included:
1. All which concerns the security and the convenience of passing on the
* streets, wharves, public squares and roads... ;
2. The authority to repress disturbances of the public peace such as quar-
rels and disputes accompanied by disorders on the streets;
3. The maintenance of public order in places where large gatherings of
people take place.
C. civ. art. 7 (1791).
C. civ. art. 1 (1932).
.. Observations of the Commissioner of the Government Gazier in the Daudignac case,
Council of State, June 22, 1951, [19511 Dalloz, Legislation [D.L.] 589. See note 122 infra.
I's Id.
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Soon after the profession of street photographing became estab-
lished, it incurred the wrath of those photographers who limited their ac-
tivities to the work in their establishments, and in some instances, admin-
istrative authorities decided to intervene. The result, as of 1928, was an
outright prohibition against exercising the profession in Paris, and re-
strictions were imposed on it in some other localities. The few reported
cases that dealt with these regulations did not arise until after World War
II.
The first one was a criminal proceeding directed against a street pho-
tographer who violated a Grasse City ordinance prohibiting the taking of
photographs of passersby on public roads "with a commercial purpose,
and particularly in view of selling these portraits to the persons thus pho-
tographed by surprise." The defendant disregarded the ordinance, claim-
ing it was illegal as contrary to the principle of freedom of commerce and
industry. An action against him was instituted by an association of pro-
fessional photographers.
The right of the mayor of a town to regulate the profession of pho-
tographers was upheld:
The custom established by the photographers of pursuing customers in the
streets without waiting for them to appear in their studios ... seems to be
only an abusive extension of the right to exercise the freedom of trade and
industry; . . . the exercise of any profession whatever is unlawful when re-
spect for freedom and desires of others is not taken into consideration;...
the power to settle rules which the mayor has corresponds with the neces-
sity to ensure respect of the human person and freedom of customers.'1
The tribunal proceeded to impose a fine of 1,200 F and recognized
that the association of photographers, as the "civil party" in the case,
represented the interests of those members of the profession who are "re-
specting the customers' freedom." According to the tribunal, they were
damaged by the defendant's conduct and were granted the token amount
of 1 F as nominal damages. 120
The case did not go further than to the court of first instance. Its
result did not escape criticism. Thus, commenting upon the decision, Pro-
fessor Carbonnier, a leading French expert in the field of civil responsibil-
ity, recognized the authority of the mayor to exercise the police power
over public streets, but questioned their jurisdiction in the field of assur-
ing individual freedom to the citizens in the absence of legal texts on
which such an action could be based. Asserting that the right to one's
own likeness is one of "the personality rights" rather than a property
right, he stated that the element of damages is necessary for judicial in-
"9 Judgment of Feb. 8, 1950, Trib. corr., Grasse, [1950] Dalloz, Jurisprudence [D. Jur.] 712.
120 Id.
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tervent n and that no damage could be inflicted, except in some unusual
situations, by the defendant, as the passersby were exhibiting their faces
to one another. Stating that previous cases supported only the proposi-
tion that everyone has the right to object to the reproduction and publi-
cation (rather than to the taking) of his likeness, Carbonnier concluded
that the extensive protection of the "dignity of the human person," ad-
vanced by the tribunal in times where the State itself forces us to be
frequently photographed, could seem to be precious. Behind the facade of
individual freedoms, however, two business interests staged a fight: those
of sedentary and those of street photographers. If a custom of street
photographing was being established, it could be said that taking advan-
tage of it could not amount to any wrongful conduct.'21
Soon thereafter, the Council of State was called to express its opinion
whether administrative authorities have jurisdiction to interfere with the
profession. It expressed its approach to the problem in three opinions of
1951, dealing with the validity of some local ordinances. The first ordi-
nance, issued by the mayor of Montauban, required street photographers
to obtain licenses whose conditions were set out in some detail before
they could engage in their activities, even temporarily. The second ordi-
nance, issued by the mayor of Villeneuve-sur-Lot, simply prohibited the
taking of photographs of the passersby on public streets "when such ac-
tivities are engaged in for any commercial purpose, and in particular, with
the view of selling their portrait to persons thus photographed by sur-
prise." The wording of the ordinance involved in the third case and is-
sued by the mayor of Rodez was nearly identical with that of Villeneuve.
The opinions of the Council were very short, even by French stan-
dards. In the first case, citing the Law of 1884, it reaffirmed the powers of
local authorities to prevent possible inconveniences to circulation and
public order, particularly "by prohibiting. . . the taking of photographs
of the passersby against their wish or by forbidding, in case of necessity,
the exercise of this profession on certain streets or at certain hours." The
Council held, however, that the freedom of industry and commerce guar-
anteed by the Law of 1912 would be violated by subjecting the profession
to licensing, and therefore, the challenged ordinance was invalid, as the
mayor issuing it acted in exc~s de pouvoir.2 2
If licensing of street photographers is contrary to the law, there is no
problem about invalidating a total prohibition to exercise the profession.
The court annulled the ordinances in the second12 and third case.' 2" The
opinions were greeted by Professor Carbonnier as being inspired "by a
is' Id.
11. Daudignac, Council of State, June 22, 1951 [1951] J.C.P. II 6515.
.. Association of Photographers, etc., Council of State, June 22, 1951 [1951] J.C.P. II 6515.
12' National Federation of Photographers, Council of State, June 22, 1951, [1951] D.L. 589.
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most fargoing wisdom," because the taking of photographs without re-
ceiving consent is permissible; it is unlawful, however, if permission has
been denied. 12
5
" A few years later, the Cour de Cassation was called to express its
opinion on a city ordinance issued by the mayor of Nice, similar to the
one in Grasse and involving the same party. The court affirmed the power
of the authorities to issue all regulations necessary "to remedy the incon-
veniences which the exercise of the profession of photographing on public
streets may present to the traffic and the public order" and in particular,
to prohibit the taking of photographs against the wish of the passersby
and to prohibit this activity on certain streets or during some hours. The
court went on to invalidate the ordinance, however, on the ground that it
was too broad, being applicable to fifty-eight streets, as well as the beach
during 51/2 months and in some other places. Such rules "make it practi-
cally impossible to exercise the profession" and are "repugnant to the
freedom of industry and commerce."1 6
While a ministerial decree of July 22, 1952 was held to be valid as
long as it required advance declarations of the photographers about their
activities, prohibited exhibition of the photographs, and provided for the
destruction of the negatives upon a request of the interested persons, it
was invalid where it outlawed the taking of photographs in the vicinity of
sedentary photographers. 127 One of the recent developments is an ordi-
nance issued by the police chief of Paris, banning street photographs in
tourist areas of Paris, which included a long list of monuments, parks and
streets covered by the ordinance."2 " It appears that the ordinance has yet
to be examined by the courts.
In the United States, no identical problems have been decided by the
courts. The most widely publicized case in recent years involved a pho-
tographer who established as his profession the taking of pictures of Mrs.
Jacqueline Onassis and selling them for a profit. 29 The photographer,
Ronald Galella, sued Mrs. Onassis for interference with his trade, and she
counterclaimed, inter alia, that his actions constituted a violation of com-
mon law and constitutional rights of privacy. It is interesting to note that
'25 Note signed J.C. to the first and third cases in [19511 D.L. 589. One commentator re-
marked that "[T]he Council of State delivered its decision only in view of the requirements
of circulation as a public street .... a solution [which] does not endanger, in any way,
personality rights, because ... the photographer cannot give any publicity to the negative."
Stoufifet, supra note 9, at 10.
126 Judgment of July 18, 1957, Cass. crim., Fr., [1957] D. Jur. 8.
127 Judgment of Oct. 10, 1957, Cass. crim. Fr., [1957] Bulletin des arrets de la Cour de Cas-
sation, Chambre criminelle [Bull. Crim.] n.625.
128 Official Gazette of July 19, 1969.
119 Galella v. Onassis, 353 F. Supp. 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd in part and modified in part,
487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973).
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nowhere in the Galella opinions did the courts suggest that Galella
should not take pictures of Mrs. Onassis. Rather, the decisions were con-
cerned with his conduct in taking them. The district court recognized
that "[Mrs. Onassis] is a public figure. Nevertheless, the First Amend.
ment does not immunize all conduct designed to gather information
about or photographs of a public figure. There is no general constitutional
right to assault, harass, or unceasingly shadow or distress public
figures."' 0 With regard to Galella's photography, the court stated:
"Galella's occupation is lawful and the objective of [our] order is to mod-
ify his conduct, not to prevent his photography.' 'I
The district court designated a minimum distance from which
Galella could photograph Mrs. Onassis, her children, her home, and the
children's schools. The distance was reduced by the court of appeals.
There were no allegations, at least in the text of the opinions of the two
courts, that Galella was intruding upon Onassis' privacy through the use
of telephoto equipment. Galella was enjoined, however, from "performing
surveillance of [Onassis] or her children."'3 2
Among the many recent French invasion of privacy cases involving
famous persons, there are a few in which Brigitte Bardot was the plain-
tiff. One dealt with the publication of photographs, surreptitiously taken.
It appears that the defendant's photographers climbed a tree and took
some pictures of the actress by telescopic lens while she was playing with
her child in the privacy of her garden. The defendant argued that the
plaintiff was a well-known personality who was holding many press con-
ferences and interviews, did not object to the taking and publishing of her
photographs in the past, and declared that she was an open book. In es-
sence, the defense claimed she was a public figure accepting and even
seeking publicity.
The court nevertheless sided with the plaintiff, reasoning that her
lack of objections to the circulation of her photographs, "even for an ex-
tended period of time, cannot raise a presumption of either a waiver of
her personality right to her likeness or of an equation of her private life
to her public life." The court held that the publication of a photographic
likeness of another without his consent "constitutes a fault the author of
which is bound to repair," with the exception of public figures repre-
sented in the course of their professional life. The court limited the recov-
ery to the nominal amount of 1 F "for the mental disturbance she exper-
ienced" and the publication of the judgment in three newspapers. "'
One commentator of the case has observed that the fact that the
130 353 F. Supp. at 223.
131 Id. at 237.
"' Id. at 241.
13 Judgment of Nov. 24, 1965, Tr. gr. inst., Seine, [1966] J.C.P. H 14521.
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plaintiff used to undress on the screen did not authorize others to peep
through the keyhole to observe plaintiff in other activities.'" Professor
Rodiere added that it would be permissible to publish the plaintiffs pho-
tograph taken in a public place, even against her wishes, because a per-
sonality may be considered as being "presented to the public" as soon as
he is on the public street. The photographers in the Bardot case, however,
were hiding from the plaintiff, realizing that the permission to take the
pictures would be denied to them. They were aware that they were violat-
ing a right; they acted "in bad faith.1' 35 In a similar case, The Duchess of
Windsor was granted $32,000 in damages by a French court against a tel-
evision station and a newspaper which published a picture surreptitiously
taken of her hobbling about her garden. 1
6
The Restatement of Torts for actionable interference with privacy
states:
A person who unreasonably and seriously interferes with another's in-
terest in not having his affairs known to others or his likeness exhibited to
the public is liable to the other.
Comments to this section specify:
c) ... One who is not a recluse must expect the ordinary incidents of com-
munity life of which he is a part. These include comment upon his conduct,
the more or less casual observation of his neighbors as to what he does upon
his own land and the possibility that he may be photographed as a part of a
street scene or a group of persons ....
d) . . . [L]iability exists only if the defendant's conduct was such that he
should have realized that it would be offensive to persons of ordinary sensi-
bilities. It is only where the intrusion has gone beyond the limits of decency
that liability occurs. These limits are exceeded where. . . photographs of a
person in an embarassing pose are surreptitiously taken and published
.... In determining liability, the knowledge and motives of the defendant,
the sex, station in life, previous habits of the plaintiff with reference to pub-
licity, and other similar matters are considered. 13 7
Citing the Restatement, a Tennessee court denied relief in Martin v.
Senators, Inc.,138 stating that the use of the plaintiffis photograph after
her consent to its "virtually public exhibition" on a former occasion
"could not be characterized as an unreasonable and serious interference
with privacy.""
13, Id. (Comment signed by R.L.).
135 Rodi~re, in 1966 REV. TRIM. DR. Civ. 288, 294.
136 Detroit News, October 14, 1976.
137 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 867 (1939).
138 220 Tenn. 465, 418 S.W.2d 660 (1967).
" Compare Lillie v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 139 Cal. App. 724, 34 P.2d 835 (1934) with
Wheeler v. P. Sorensen Mfg. Co., Inc., 415 S.W.2d 582 (Ky. 1967).
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The most recent thinking is reflected in Tentative Draft of the Re-
statement Second (April 5, 1975), which lays down the general principle
that "one who invades the right of privacy of another is subject to liabil-
ity to the other if the invasion is unreasonable." It also specifies that two
elements are necessary for liability: the matter concerning the private life
of another which was published must be "highly.offensive to a reasonable
person," and "is not of legitimate concern to the public."
Photographing employees in the course of their employment may be
warranted for research efforts to increase efficiency of operations and pro-
mote safety of employees. In Thomas v. General Electric Co.,14 0 the
plaintiff requested that his picture not be taken but did not disclose any
reason other than he felt that the taking of pictures invaded his right of
privacy. Subsequently, the defendant employer took motion pictures of
the plaintiff, which were to be used only in the study of the defendant's
operations, without his consent. The court found the defendant not liable,
agreeing with counsel that
[a] defendant employer has a right to photograph its employee in the per-
formance of his ... duties to increase the efficiency of its operations or to
promote safety, but that this right is inferior to the rights of the employee
when said photographing may affect the health, welfare, domestic situation
of employee's home life, may make the employee nervous or subject the em-
ployee to undue or unfair criticism by his or her fellow employees.""
None of these elements were found to exist in Thomas, however, and
the court noted that it found no case forbidding an employer to use such
means to improve the efficiency of its workers and promote their safety.
It should be added that there may not be liability where the plaintiff
is unidentifiable. Thus, where the defendant published a photograph of a
racing car accident in which the plaintiff was involved, but in which the
car alone could be seen, the case was dismissed. 42 The name of the plain-
tiff need not appear in the publication, however, in order to make it ac-
tionable. Where a photograph of a taxicab driver was published as an
illustration in an article directed against taxicab drivers, identification of
the plaintiff was sufficient to entitle her to bring an action."43
CONCLUSION
The angry reaction of some persons to the taking of their photo-
graphs is well known; and in many situations, they do not care whether
the photographer will keep the pictures for himself or make public use of
140 207 F. Supp. 792 (W.D. Ky. 1962).
... Id. at 799 (quotation omitted).
... Branson v. Fawcett Pubs. Inc., 124 F. Supp. 429 (E.D. Ill. 1954).
"' Peay v. Curtis Pub. Co., 78 F. Supp. 305 (D.D.C. 1948).
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them.
It happens much less frequently that a public official raises similar
objections, although such instances are not uncommon. Thus, in Martin
v. Dorton,"" a sheriff assaulted a newspaper representative who took pho-
tographs of the sheriff and of a crowd signing petitions for better law
enforcement. It was unclear whether he knew the identity of the photog-
rapher or the purpose of taking the photographs. In an action for assault
and battery, the sheriff interposed a defense predicated upon a violation
of his right of privacy, but the court found his conduct unjustified, as the
pictures had been taken in connection with a legitimate news story.1 45 As
shown above, the main concern of judicial decisions and legislation is
about the publication of photographs rather than their taking. The very
taking, however, may be objected to and disturbing, since nobody takes
photographs to keep the negatives undeveloped and unused. It seems that
it would be advisable to extend protection to the taking of photographs
against an individual's wishes, in proper situations. After all, the issue of
the right of privacy is the mental tranquillity of the people rather than
their property or financial interests. In some jurisdictions, the "right to
publicity" has been developed by the courts, and it can be computed in
monetary terms. In general, however, the gist of privacy is human
dignity.14
6
An example for the treatment of mere photographing may be taken
from another area of privacy: wiretapping. Here, the courts are willing to
grant recovery whether the overheard conversations are published or not.
"144 210 Miss. 668, 50 So. 2d 391 (1951).
1' The Martin court added:
While it is true that the modern invention of instantaneous photography now in
vogue is such as to afford the means of securing a portraiture of an individual's face
and form without first giving an opportunity in advance for adequate adjustment of
the facial expression, wearing apparel and posture of the person to be photographed,
and often may not result in a good likeness being obtained such as would be pleasing
to the officer involved and to his admiring friends and constituents, it is nevertheless
not a sufficient ground to justify an assault and battery on an otherwise inoffensive
photographer. If a servant of the dear people is thus humiliated by a published pho-
tograph that does not seem to do justice to him, the law leaves his feelings of disap-
pointment and chagrin to be helped and vindicated by the tremendous force of public
sympathy.
Strange as it may seem, however, most public men are natural born pacifists even
toward an impertinent person with a camera, while now and then a few assume a
more or less beligerent (sic) attitude, either real or fancied, depending upon the cir-
cumstances in each case and the mood of the victim.
Id. at 675, 50 So. 2d at 394. Following the battery, the sheriff's photograph appeared in the
local newspaper, and it "[compared] favorably with that of most of the other sheriffs ....
Id.
"I0 Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39
N.Y.U.L. REv. 962 (1964).
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Thus, in Roach v. Harper, 7 for example, the defendant rented an apart-
ment to the plaintiff. By installing a listening device connected to a
speaker in his office, the defendant heard everything said in the plaintiff's
apartment, including numerous personal, social, private, and confidential
conversations. In an action for invasion of privacy, the defendant de-
murred on the ground that the plaintiff did not allege that the defendant
repeated or published anything he overheard and that she did not suffer
any special damages. The Supreme Court of West Virginia overruled the
demurrer, stating that publication may aggravate the tort, but is not es-
sential for recovery. Stressing the importance of the right of privacy in
present times, the court equated photographing with eavesdropping, say-
ing: "To hold otherwise, under modern means of communication, hearing
devices, photography, and other technological advancements, would effec-
tively deny valuable rights and freedoms to the individual."' 4
Therefore, with respect to private individuals not involved in current
events of legitimate public interest, protection of privacy should be fargo-
ing and include prohibition against the very taking of their photographs
not only in private but also in public places, as soon as they express any
objection, and irrespective of whether the defendant acts reasonably and
whether the invasion of privacy is serious. Of course, no damages should
be required to be proven.
The taking of photographs as a part of the general scenery in public
places should be permitted, with the reservation that if the picture should
encompass a person who does not care to be on the picture, the photogra-
pher should give him an opportunity to get out of the range of vision. For
a photographer aiming at the taking of a specific individual's picture, his
advance consent should be necessary. The same rule should apply to pho-
tographs taken in private places.
Publication of public scenes including an individual who incidentally
finds himself on the picture should be permitted with the reservation de-
veloped by the French that in case he objects, his face should be obliter-
ated so as to make him unidentifiable.
All world travelers have experienced difficulties in taking photo-
graphs of street scenes in many countries. Frequently, the local populace
advance serious objections about appearing on the picture, either as the
main subject or as a part of the general scenery. While sometimes their
resistance thaws on the sight of a coin, their general sentiment is that it is
up to them to give or refuse permission to be on the photograph. There is
no question of legal rules-just of the deeply imbedded feelings.
It is remarkable that the development of the law of privacy was the
143 W. Va. 869, 105 S.E.2d 564 (1958).
148 Id. at 876, 105 S.E.2d at 568.
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work of the courts, both in the United States and in France, where the
statutory texts were adopted as late as 1970. The texts are very general
and provide only sketchy guidance. It may thus be said that the rules
created by judicial decisions will continue to be the basis of the law of
privacy.1 4
9
The new text of Article 9 of the French Civil Code'50 provides that
"[e]veryone has the right to have his private life respected," and Article
368 of the Criminal Code, enacted at the same time, makes it a crime
punishable by imprisonment from 2 months to 1 year or by fine or both
the "fixing or transmitting, with any device, the likeness of someone be-
ing in a private place, without his consent." It is added that consent is
presumed where the acts in question have been accomplished "during a
meeting, within the sight and knowledge of the participants." It has been
emphasized that the new law does not require a proof of damages for
recovery.' 5 '
"' Pradel, Les dispositions de la loi No. 70-643 du 17 juillet 1970 sur la protection de la vie
privee, [1971] Dalloz-Sirey, Legislation [D.S.L.] chron. 111; Lindon, Les dispositions de la
loi du 17 juillet 1970 relatives & la protection de la vie privee, [1970] D.S.L. 2357, point 4.
15 C. civ. art. 9, No. 70-643 (1970).
"' Pradel, supra note 149, at 111.
